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Abstract 
What can explain the radical right party voting of citizens that have emigrated abroad? 
Results from the 2014 SOM survey of Swedish expatriates show that 7% of the expatriate 
population voted for the radical right party of Sweden – the Sweden Democrats. The research 
area of radical right party support is substantial, and there have been numerous studies 
presenting explanations to why individuals vote for radical right parties. But so far, there 
exists no previous investigations of whether these explanations hold for a group of citizens 
that live abroad. This thesis combines previous research on explanations to radical right 
support, with the theory of transnationalism, which argues that citizens emigrating from their 
home country develop identities that are either transborder (only connecting them to their 
home country) or transnational (connecting them to two or more countries). The hypotheses 
tested are 1) if previously ‘established’ explanations on radial right vote support also can 
explain expatriates voting for the Sweden Democrats 2) if expatriates differently developed 
national identities affect their vote support for the Sweden Democrats 3) if the presumed 
effect of explanations such as anti-immigrant attitudes leads to even higher likelihood of 
voting for the Sweden Democrats among expatriate voters with strong national identity. By 
conducting several logistic regressions, this thesis shows firstly, that Swedish expatriates with 
negative attitudes towards immigration and with low political trust are much more likely to 
vote for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, there is no effect of expatriates differently 
developed identities and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Finally, no interaction effect is 
found: having different types of national identities does not moderate the effect of attitudes to 
immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats. 
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1. Introduction  
For thousands of years, people have migrated all over the world in search for happiness and a 
better life. Until recently, migration mostly concerned humans from low income countries 
moving to high-income countries. But as the world has become more globalized, people from 
both low-income countries and affluent countries take the opportunity to move across borders. 
In relation to this, an increased attention has been directed towards researching people 
migrating from developed countries (World Migration Report 2013:25). Emigrants from 
Sweden can be considered as a part of this development, as Sweden is an advanced industrial 
state with a highly progressed economy (Solevid 2016:9). Looking back at Swedish 
emigration history, the 1800s were the time when big waves of emigrants left Sweden in 
search for happiness in the West. Sweden have since then been considered to be an 
immigration country. But in 2011, statistics showed that the number of emigrants were bigger 
than during the top year of 1887 (SCB).1 According to the theory of transnationalism, when 
citizens emigrate from their home country to a host country, and travel back and forth as a 
circular migrant, they develop identities that often connects them to two or more nation states. 
The theory of transnationalism further argues that the multiplicity of political and social 
involvements affects migrants’ values, habits and the way they make decisions (Basch et.al 
1994: 7). Studies have shown that these transnational experiences and the relationship with 
the home country also can affect the electoral behavior of migrants (Lafluer & Dominguez 
2015).  
 
Alongside with globalization, not least manifested in increased migration, radical right parties 
with strong anti-immigrant sentiments have emerged all through Europe. A great amount of 
research has been conducted to investigate the explanations behind individuals voting for 
radical right parties. Lubbers et.al (2002:348) argues that attitudinal positions are the most 
important factor to consider, specifically anti-immigration attitudes and political distrust. 
Other explanations are that immigrants are perceived as a cultural threat to Western values, 
but also as an economical threat to the welfare state and the labor market (Kriesi 2006). 
Scholars also argue that the anti-globalization message that radical right parties have attracted 
the so called ‘losers’ of globalization, that is voters that do not benefit from the current 
economic globalization who wishes to see stronger national boundaries and national identities 
                                                 
1 There are, however, more people that immigrate into Sweden than people emigrating out of Sweden. Because 
of the refugee crisis that has been going on for the last three years, the immigration levels have reached a record 
amount, this according to SCB. https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/in-och-
utvandring/  
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(Zaslove 2008: 169, Kreisi 2006). It is possible to consider expats, especially expats from 
Western societies, to be the opposite, that is the ‘winners’ of globalization, as they are people 
that enjoy more fluent boarders, benefit from international competition and might have 
national identities that connect them to both their home country and their host country (Tsuda 
2012: 642; Levitt and Schiller 2004: 1009). Focusing on the case of Sweden, research have 
shown that 7% of Swedish expats votes for the radical right winged party of Sweden 
Democrats, whose main success has grown from their anti-immigration and nationalistic 
policies (Oscarsson 2016; Rydgren & van der Maiden 2018). Hence, there is a plausible 
conundrum here, where people who are immigrants themselves and enjoy the freedoms of 
globalization, votes for a party that noticeably works with policies against globalization and 
immigration. Thus, these voters act in a way that challenges our previous notions of radical 
right support. The overall aim of this thesis it to investigate this specific occurrence, and look 
into what can explain Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. To reach the 
aim, the thesis draws and integrates on two strands of literature; firstly, research on motivators 
and explanations to radical right wing voting, secondly, research on transnationalism, a theory 
about how migrant experiences from two or more nation-states affects their actions, values 
and identities (Basch et al. 1994, Tsuda 2012). Together, they will be used to investigate the 
underlying explanations to why Swedish expatriates votes for the Sweden Democrats. 
 
In a time with increased migration in general, the political behavior and influence of migrants 
towards their home country becomes more interesting to study. Not least as voters residing 
abroad have been described as playing a crucial role in different home country elections in 
recent years (Lafluer & Dominguez 2015: 156, Oscarsson 2016: 259). In the context of 
Sweden, Oscarsson (2016) showed in his study that expats voted quite differently than 
residential swedes, and that they were more right-winged in their voting behavior. This is an 
important finding, and something that needs to be developed, as there is not much research on 
how citizens who vote from abroad make decisions in favor of one political party over 
another. Additionally, this thesis also contributes to radical right research. Previous research 
has mainly drawn conclusions on explanations to radical right support on residential citizens. 
Migrants that vote from abroad are a new group of people in the context of radical right 
electoral support, and therefore a group that needs to be studied to be able to expand this field 
of research. 
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1.1 Aim 
By drawing from research on both radical right voting and the theory of transnationalism, this 
thesis aims to investigate the explanations behind Swedish expats voting support for the 
Sweden Democrats. To be more specific, this thesis aims firstly to examine whether 
‘established’ explanations on radial right electoral support, such as anti-immigration attitudes, 
distrust to politicians and distrust to other people in general, also are valid explanations to 
why expatriates from Sweden vote for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, as transnational 
experiences such as relations to home and host country have proven to affect expats political 
behavior in combination with that previous research has showed that national identity affect 
support for radical right parties, this thesis aims to examine whether transnational 
experiences, and mainly the developed national identities from those experiences, affects 
Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Thirdly, the aim is also to investigate 
whether the presumed effect of explanations such as anti-immigrant attitudes leads to even 
higher likelihood of voting for the Sweden Democrats among expatriate voters with strong 
national identity.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework will be conceptualized and developed. It will lay the 
foundation for the investigation that will follow to peruse the aim of this thesis. The thesis 
will mainly be based on previous research on radical right voters as well as the theory of 
transnationalism. This chapter will first present both of these concepts individually, to later be 
able to present both of them together as a basis for this thesis.  
 
2.1 Definition and explanations to radical right voting 
 
2.1.1 Definition of radical right parties 
Since the middle of the 1980s, Western Europe has experienced an increase of parties within 
the radical right party family. Even though scholars have labeled them differently (‘extreme 
right’, ‘right-wing populist’, ‘anti-immigration’) most of them agree upon what characterizes 
the basics of this party family (Rydgren 2007, Mudde 2007, Jungar & Jupkås 2014, Van der 
Brug 2000). Mudde (2007:19) argues that ‘nativism’ constitutes the very core of the ideology 
of the larger radical right party family, and that it is a combination of xenophobia and 
nationalism. Nativism as an ideology holds that states exclusively should be inhabited by 
native groups, and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening 
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to the homogeneous nation-state. Furthermore, as radical right parties are exclusionary in their 
politics, it implies very strict assimilation and anti-immigration policies and a large criticism 
towards multi-culturalism (Jungar & Jupskås 2014: 218).  
 
In their party program, the Sweden Democrats describes themselves as a social conservative 
party with a nationalistic foundation. They claim that their goal is to form a political 
movement that will guard the common national identity of Sweden, which can only be 
achieved if there are high degrees of ethnical and cultural likeness among the population. The 
party strongly opposes multiculturalism, which they claim leads to disharmony and conflict 
(Widfeldt 2008; Rydgren & van der Maiden 2018; Principprogram, Sverigedemokraterna 
2003, 2011). Widfeldt (2008:272) argues that the Sweden Democrats emphasis on common 
ethnic and cultural identity can be seen as an expression of ethno-pluralism, sometimes called 
culturalism, which is interpreted as all ethnic groups being are equal, but that they should be 
kept separate. Further, Mulinari & Neergard (2014:49) argues that the Sweden Democrats 
focuses on creating a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and uses it as a right to exclude 
others. The people considered as ‘them’ are not only different, but problematically different – 
as they differ from what is considered normal. Thus, by drawing from previous research on 
radical right parties, but also on research specifically about the Sweden Democrats, it is 
possible to define them as a radical right party with a nationalistic agenda. That is, a party 
with strong anti-immigration policies and an extensive criticism towards multiculturalism, 
with an idea of Sweden mainly being inhabited by native groups. 
 
2.1.2 ‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization 
Research on radical right parties show that they have long campaigned against the forces of 
globalization and denationalization. Radical right parties argue that the financial and political 
elites together with the growing influence of the European Union destroys the natural fabric 
of civil society (Zaslove 2008: 169). Generally, the effects of political and economic 
globalization mainly manifest themselves at the national level. National politics are 
challenged both from above- through new forms of international cooperation- and from 
below, at the regional and local level (Kriesi et.al 2008:3). Over the past decades, effects of 
globalization have created a division between so called “winners” and “losers” in Western 
Europe, and these categories are articulated by political parties. The winners in this situation 
are citizens who are high skilled workers, with a higher educational degree, who work in a 
sector that benefit from international competition and are open to all kinds of cosmopolitan 
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citizens. The expected losers are the ones with lower education, unqualified jobs and citizens 
who strongly identify themselves with their national community (Kriesi 2006: 922). Time and 
time again, research has shown that lower educated, low-skilled workers are more prone to 
show electoral support for radical right parties (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, Givens 2004). 
Theories of economic interest (Lipset 1960) have proposed that being unemployed or a 
manual worker with a lower level of education puts you in a similar social category as 
immigrants. Scholars argue that being in the same social category makes you more likely to 
perceive them (immigrants) as an economic threat, and will therefore make you more likely to 
vote for a radical right party (Lubbers et.al 2002: 348). It can also affect how individuals view 
the labor market competition, and see immigrants as the reason for themselves being 
unemployed. Furthermore, it can add to a belief that immigrants drain on the welfare system 
that may eventually leave these individuals less well-off (O’Rourke & Sinnot 2005: 843). 
Moreover, globalization poses a potential cultural threat as well. But this threat is not 
experienced in the same way by all members of the national community, and the individual 
level of education plays an important role. Kriesi et.al (2008:7) argues that education has a 
‘liberalizing’ effect that introduces a shift in political values towards cultural liberalism and 
universalism. It contributes to openness and cultural tolerance towards immigrants and 
foreigners. Hjerm (2001:56) also argues that education has an effect on nationalistic pride and 
xenophobic values, where higher education levels is associated with decreased levels of 
national pride and xenophobic values. Additionally, education contributes to professional 
success as well. Highly educated individuals are marketable inside and across the national 
borders, thus increasing one’s exit options. Thus, on the one hand, there are those who have 
the mobility and convertible resources that allows them to exit if needed, on the other hand, 
there are those who remain locked in because of the lack of resources (Kresi et.al 2008:5).  
 
These economic and cultural threats have created a political space for the new populist radical 
right parties to take place. The radical right parties use a strategy of thriving on the fears and 
worries of the ‘losers’ about economical transformations and cultural diversity. Ethnically 
different populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity of the 
native population. Individuals that support nationalism and who possess a strong 
identification with their national community, will perceive globalization weakening their 
status. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms and identity perceives this as something 
positive.  
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2.1.3 Previous research on what explains radical right voting 
While globalization theory is more of a theoretical perspective in the frame of radical right 
voting behavior, there is also an empirical perspective, with previous research on explanations 
behind radical right voting. Previous research shows that attitudinal positions are an important 
explanation behind radical right voting, with anti-immigration attitudes being the most 
important one (Lubbers et.al 2002).  Research show that individuals who perceive immigrants 
negatively and hold them accountable when state’s economy and welfare plunges have a 
larger incentive to vote for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, Lubbers et.al 2002). Likewise, 
individuals who view immigrants as a cultural threat and feel like they are diminishing 
Western values and social cohesion have shown to be more likely to vote for the radical right 
(Lubbers et.al 2002:349). These anti-immigrant attitudes largely originate from a nationalist 
sentiment and pride, where patriotism and chauvinism generally have a large positive effect 
on anti-immigrant emotion (O’Rourke & Sinnot: 2005:851, Hjerm 2001). The results 
concerning anti-immigrant attitudes are in line with the theory of winners/losers of 
globalization, showing that feelings of economic, cultural and national identity threats are 
common traits for individuals that vote for radical right parties. In addition to anti-immigrant 
attitudes, scholars also press on the importance to consider political trust and political 
dissatisfaction as factors for radical right voting (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000; Zhirkov 2014, 
Kehrberg 2014, Sannerstedt 2015). Voters with low political trust who are discontent with the 
current system respond well to rhetoric about protecting the interests of the ‘common people’. 
They can be characterized by political cynicism and low trust towards the current politicians 
and the established parties. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the current political system and 
general disappointment in politics are also very important characteristics in radical right 
voters, especially in West European countries. People who are politically dissatisfied are 
likely to cast a protest vote, and because radical right winged-parties position themselves 
against the current system, these parties are an attractive alternative (Lubbers et.al 2002:349). 
Consequently, people that are satisfied with the current system and with the current politicians 
are less likely to oppose the current political system and not vote for the radical right party. 
Another aspect of trust that has been examined is social and generalized trust. Rydgren 
(2009:140) means that earlier research only has focused on political trust, whereas his 
research, drawing from theories about social isolation, shows that lower generalized and 
social trust makes individuals more likely to support radical right parties.2 
                                                 
2 Paragraph taken from course paper in SF2321 Applied Statistical Analysis – Muleta (2018) Swedish expats 
support for radical right parties- and the explanations behind it.  
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To summarize, the globalization theory together with previous research on radical right voting 
derive the conclusion that economic, cultural, political and attitudinal positions are important 
for explaining not only the radical right electoral success, but also why some people are more 
likely to support them more than others. The scientific interest for the radical right and their 
voters has of course increased in line with their success, and endless of research have been 
conducted, mainly in Western Europe (Zhirkov, O’Rourke & Sinnot, Lubbers et.al, Mudde 
2007, Givens 2004, Rydgren 2008, Kehrberg 2014). What this thesis aims to contribute with 
is to test these explanations on a new group of individuals that stand out from our previous 
notion of the radical right voter. Additionally, by adding a second strand of literature, 
transnationalism, this thesis will contribute with a new perspective to the current radical right 
research. 
 
2.2 Transnationalism – an overview 
The term transnationalism can be traced back to early 1900s, when it was first used by 
Randolph Bourne in his paper “Trans-National America”. He described how immigrants in 
America could contribute with a great mix of cultures and people, something that we today 
would call “multiculturalism” (Bourne 1916). However, in the research field of migration, it 
was first used in the 1990s and has gotten increasingly more attention by scholars since then. 
One of the first formulations of transnationalism as a theory was released in 1994, by Basch, 
Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc. They emphasized that the essential element of 
transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that immigrants have in both their country 
of origin and their country of settlement. By partaking in these involvements, immigrants 
build social fields that cross geographic, political and cultural borders. Immigrants developing 
and maintaining multiple relationships – economic, social, political or organizational- are 
called transmigrants. Further, Basch et.al (1994:7) emphasizes that the actions taken, 
decisions made and identities developed by transmigrants can be embedded in networks 
simultaneously connecting them to two or more nation-states. This definition of 
transnationalism allows us to analyze the fluid experiences of these transmigrants, who act in 
ways that challenge our previous notions of geographical space and social identity. More 
specifically, it allows us to see how they are affected by their transnational experiences and 
practices.  
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However, if we look back in history, bi-national, political and social involvements were 
investigated and researched well before it was called ‘transnationalism’. Immigration 
historians have documented nearly all American immigrant groups and their enduring 
participation in both host and home countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Joppke and Morawska (2003:21) argues that the view that these new transnational spaces has 
created a - supposedly non-existent in the past - political sphere is improper. In the turn of the 
twentieth century, sending states in eastern and southern Europe clearly involved immigrant 
communities abroad in their own nation-building processes. Despite this critique directed 
against the foundations of transnationalism, contemporary transnationalism is of course not a 
replica of the old, but shaped by a different set of circumstances. For example, the 
development of technology, both in communication and transportation, have made present 
day transnational connections more dense and intense than in the past. Further, the connection 
is much more spread and varied in content because contemporary immigrants are much more 
diverse in socioeconomic background, racial identification, regional origin and gender. Lastly, 
the judicial systems of both the sending and receiving country are today more accepting of 
diversity than in the past. More specifically, immigrants are not as much subject to demands 
from home and host countries concerning their national commitments as they were in the past 
(Joppke & Morawska 2003:22). 
 
The breath of transnationalism – everything from social movements to economic relations to 
migrant ties to their homeland- is difficult to research and comprehend, let alone analyze 
(Mahler 1998:66). Consequently, this thesis will try to delimitate the theory to a more 
manageable size of framework- by focusing on political transnationalism, homeland politics 
and the possibility of differently developed identities. This will be apparent in the next section 
of this chapter, where the definition and effects of political transnationalism will be discussed.  
 
2.3 Political transnationalism and developed identities 
The concept of political transnationalism can be defined as various forms of cross-border 
political participation, such as citizens being engaged in political associations in two different 
countries, voting from abroad or political campaigning running across borders (Ostergaard-
Nielsen 2003: 762). Thus, it concerns both the political involvement of migrants in their 
country of origin, as well as the indirect participation via the political institutions in the host 
country (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003:762, Martinello & Lefluer 2008: 645). Levitt and Jaworsky 
(2003: 136) mention that cross-border political participation can take shape in three ways; 
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immigrants’ politics, translocal politics and homeland politics. Immigrant politics refers to 
political activities undertaken by immigrants who want to improve their social status in the 
host country, whilst translocal politics includes activities migrants take on to support localities 
in the home country. But what this thesis mainly will focus on is the domains of homeland 
politics. Homeland politics can be defined as migrant political activism in the host country, 
concerning issues of their home country. Homeland politics can be viewed as ordinary 
political activities in which citizens can participate; only that it is performed in another 
country. This mainly includes expatriate voting, but also electoral campaigning and running 
for political office.  
 
Bauböck (2003:700) argues that political transnationalism not only is about a set of activities 
that migrants become engaged in the both the sending and receiving society. It is also about 
how these activities affect transmigrants collective identities and conceptions of citizenship. 
Tsuda (2012) develops this further by emphasizing that identity is often mentioned as a 
byproduct of political transnational activity in this field of literature. The multiple 
engagement is understood to produce transnational identification, in which transnational 
identities are multiple, flexible and based on simultaneous affiliation to two or more nation-
states. The simultaneous engagement can make migrants utilize and construct flexible 
national and personal identities that are not traditionally ‘localised’ in one community (Tsuda 
2012:642, Yeoh et.al 2003: 213). But these transnational identities do not naturally get 
produced just because immigrants partake in transnational social practices. Immigrants can 
also simply have transborder (long-distance) nationalist identification, which mean that they 
are not transnational, but only identify to their home country. Tsuda (2012: 642-643) reasons 
that highly skilled professional immigrants, mainly because of their high socio-economic 
status and language skills, often have positive experiences in the host country. Those 
immigrants who have more positive experiences and are more socially integrated in the host 
society will identify to the host country in a larger extent while maintaining their transborder 
affiliations to their country of origin. Consequently, immigrants who due to social alienation, 
marginalization and distance have negative experiences will not feel at home in the host 
country and have a strengthen transborder affiliation towards their home country (Tsuda 
2012: 642). Furthermore, Berg (2007:29) agrees with the idea that individuals simultaneously 
can be attached to several territorial levels, and depending on where they feel at home, it can 
affect their attitudes and behaviors differently. By labeling it ‘territorial attachment’ as a 
proxy for national identity, Berg (2007:26, 38) demonstrates that individuals can have 
14 
 
different sets of attachments. Individuals can be attached to no country, have an exclusive 
attachment to only one country, which can be associated with what transnationalism literature 
labels as having a transborder identity, or have multiple attachments to two or more countries, 
which can be associated with having a transnational identity. I argue that expatriates’ national 
identity can be associated with radical right parties’ emphasis on nationalism, who amongst 
their electoral support have many individuals that feel nationalistic towards their home 
country. Thus, the distinction between expatriates having transborder/exclusive nationalist 
identities or having transnational/multiple identities is important to consider, as radical right 
parties mainly draw on voters who strongly identify with their home country. Consequently, 
this thesis will argue that Swedish expats with experiences that has developed transborder 
identities are more likely to identify to Sweden and thus more likely to vote for the Sweden 
Democrats.  
 
Apart from theory, previous research within the area of political transnationalism has shown 
that transnational experiences and connections have an impact on expats electoral 
participation and behavior (Lefluer and Dominguez 2014). Bauböck (2003) argues that the 
element of citizenship affects expatriates’ chances to get involved in politics. Having a double 
citizenship enables expatriates to have political rights in both home and host country, which 
increases the possibility for transnational activities. Furthermore, a study on Bolivian 
expatriates have shown that connections to home country, where you feel at home and 
educational level had an effect on Bolivian expatriates party choice. Besides that, the study 
also shows that socio-economic and demographic characteristics are strong predictors of 
expatriates’ political behavior (Lafluer & Dominguez 2014: 175).  
 
2.4 Transnationalism and radical right voting- a theoretical framework  
As the rise of the radical right in Western societies have increased in the last three decades, 
research on radical right electoral support are constantly developed by scholars. Further, with 
the increasing flow of migrants, the electoral behavior of migrants is of great relevance to 
investigate not only because of their political behavior having influence on home elections, 
but also for studies on assimilation and migration. There have been few studies on expats 
party choice, and the explanations behind their electoral behavior. Further, in the context of 
radical right voting, there has only been a small amount of research that has investigated the 
group of citizens that live and vote from abroad, and what explains their electoral support for 
these parties. Thus, this thesis is not only testing the ‘established’ explanations on radical 
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right electoral support, but also developing the explanations to radical right voting by adding 
theories of transnationalism, and more specifically why expatriates’ identity with home and 
host country should affect their propensity to vote for the Sweden democrats. By intertwining 
these theories, this thesis is able to investigate a rather understudied group of migrants, and 
will hopefully be able to find the reasons behind Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden 
Democrats. Before presenting the hypotheses, it is important to consider that most studies on 
transnationalism and political transnationalism is focused on migrants from developing areas, 
such as South America, Eastern Europe and Africa (Ahmadov & Sasse 2016, Lefluer & 
Dominguez 2014, Escobar et.al 2015), and not the reverse flow of relatively privileged 
migrants. As mentioned before, Swedish expats are representative of migrants from a 
developed country, which makes them an under-analyzed element of transnational studies. 
Many of these migrants are affluent, well-educated and have a higher political status and 
involvement in home country (Solevid 2016). Therefore, this thesis will have to consider that 
not only is there a scarce amount of research on migrants’ political behavior, but in addition, 
the existing literature on migrants’ political behavior is mainly adjusted to migrants from 
developing countries.  
 
To be able to establish the explanations behind Swedish expats support for the Sweden 
Democrats, this thesis first needs to investigate whether some (amongst several) of the well-
researched explanations behind radical right voting also can explain expatriates’ vote support 
for the Sweden Democrats. Research has shown that attitudinal positions, such as being 
negative towards immigration have a positive effect on voting for radical right parties. 
Individuals that perceive immigration negatively holds them accountable for economic and 
welfare plunges and also views them as a cultural threat because immigrants might diminish 
their Western values (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, Zhirkov 2014, Kehrberg 2014). Further, 
distrusting politicians and the political system have also been proved to have an effect on 
voting for radical right parties. Voters who are characterized by political cynicism and who 
are discontent with the current politicians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, as 
these parties usually criticizes the conventional parties and current political system (Zhrikov 
2014, Lubbers & Scheepers 2000). Additionally, social trust i.e. if people can be trusted, have 
been proven to have an association to voting for radical right parties. Voters who have a lower 
social trust, and who believe that people will try to take advantage of you, are more likely to 
support the radical right (Rydgren 2009: 136,140). Thus, this thesis expects that similar 
attitudinal positions of expats can explain their electoral support for the Swedish Democrats.  
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Hypotheses 1a (H1a): Swedish expats with a negative attitude towards immigration have a 
higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compared to expats with a positive 
attitude to immigration 
Hypotheses 1b (H1b): Swedish expats with lower levels of trust towards Swedish politicians 
and institutions have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compared to 
expats with a higher level of political trust 
Hypotheses 1c (H1c): Swedish expats with lower social trust have a higher probability to vote 
for the Sweden Democrats compared to expats with higher social trust.3 
 
Based on the theory of transnationalism and political transnationalism, multiple engagements 
in both host and home-country, enables migrants to build social fields that cross geographic, 
political and cultural borders. From the multiplicity of involvements, Tsuda (2012) argues that 
migrants’ identities evolve to either transnational identities or stay as transborder (long-
distance) national identities. The development of these identities can depend on whether an 
expat have positive or negative experiences in the country of settlement, positive experiences 
leading to transnational identities and negative experiences leading to transborder identities. 
Furthermore, having a stronger affiliation towards home country/host country can also depend 
on where the expatriates feel most at home. The Swedish expats with transborder identities 
can be assumed to have stronger affiliation to Sweden, and identify themselves more as 
Swedes than anything else. This can be combined with the notion that radical right research 
has shown that individuals with strong affiliation to their country and a strong national 
identity are more likely to support the radical right. Thus, I argue that expatriates with 
transborder national identities would be more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats and 
conversely, that Swedish expats with transnational identities would be less likely to vote for 
the Sweden Democrats.  
 
Hypotheses 2 (H2): Swedish expats with transborder nationalist identities have a higher 
probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compare to expats with a transnational identity 
                                                 
3 Other variables such as ’Political satisfaction’ and ’Dissatisfaction with democracy’ could also have been 
included in the analysis, as they are also established predictors to voting for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, 
Lubbers et.al 2002). But I argue that the three hypotheses included capture the most important ones from the 
array of explanations that have been established. Furthermore, to avoid hypotheses that would be too similar to 
each other, I, for example, chose to include only one hypothesis concerning the support for Swedish politicians 
and institutions, rather than two similar hypotheses concerning both trust towards politicians and dissatisfaction 
with politicians. 
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Turning back to the role of attitudinal positions, this thesis further hypothesizes that the effect 
of anti-immigrant attitudes on voting for the Sweden Democrats should be higher also adding 
the aspect of expatriates transborder identity. Previous research states that anti-immigration 
attitudes are one of the most established motivators to why individuals vote for radical right 
parties. Several scholars point out that the anti-immigration issue is a core message amongst 
radical right parties, and that people who perceive immigrants negatively and hold them 
accountable for economic and cultural threats support these parties. Additionally, previous 
research further shows that individuals that support nationalism, and who have a strong 
national identification to their national community are more likely to vote for radical right 
parties. O’Rourke & Sinnot (2005:851) argues that anti-immigrant attitudes largely derive 
from national identities and that having a strong nationalist identity makes individuals view 
immigrants as a potential threat to the collective identity of the native population. Thus, this 
makes them more likely to support a party that wants to preserve the cultural cohesion that 
exists. Since research show that anti-immigrant attitudes largely originate from nationalist 
identity, it is not far-fetched to assume that voting for the Sweden Democrats would be even 
higher among expatriates both having nationalist (transborder) identity and anti-immigrant 
attitudes.  
 
Hypotheses 3 (H3) The probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats is higher amongst 
transborder expats with a negative attitude to immigration, compared to transnational expats 
with a negative attitude to immigration. 
 
In figure 1 below, the hypotheses are visualized in an elaboration model. H1a, H1b and H1c 
represents the effect that attitudinal positions - anti-immigration attitude, level of trust to 
Swedish politicians and institutions and level of social trust- have on expats probability to 
vote for the Sweden Democrats. H2 represent the effect of transborder and transnational 
identification on expats probability of voting for the Sweden Democrats. Finally, H3 
represents if attitudes to immigration affect expatriates voting for the Sweden Democrats 
differently depending on different types of national identity 
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Figure 1: Elaboration model 
 
 
   
 
     
 
 
                     
 
 
3. Methodology 
This chapter will discuss and describe the chosen data for this thesis. It will also give an 
overview of the selected group of study: Swedish expats. Additionally, this chapter will also 
present and motivate the operationalization of the variables that will be included in the 
analysis. Lastly, the chosen statistical method for this thesis will be discussed. 
 
3.1 Data 
The dataset used in this thesis is the SOM survey on Swedish expats, collected by the SOM-
institute at the University of Gothenburg. This dataset provides insight to many aspects of the 
lives of Swedish expats, such as demographics, socioeconomics, political opinion and 
participation etc. This dataset is a first of its kind, as there has been no Swedish research 
institute that has collected data on Swedish citizens living abroad. The survey was conducted 
and retrieved between September 2014 to February 2015.  
 
The survey was based on a stratified probability sample of 10 000 Swedish citizens age 18-75 
registered as living abroad by the Swedish Tax Authority. The sample is disproportionally 
stratified in six geographically and/or culturally connected regions; The Nordic countries 
(n=2000), Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand (n=4000), Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet countries (1000), Africa and the Middle East (n=1000), Asia 
(n=1000) and Latin America (n=1000) (Vernsdotter 2016: 287). A disproportional stratified 
sample implies that every strata - or in this case region - proportionally represent the 
population in the region, but the sample in a whole has a skewed geographical distribution in 
Attitudinal positions 
Transnational/Transborder 
identification 
Voted for the Swedish 
Democrats 
H1a+b+c 
H3 
H2 
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relationship to the reality. This because the regions of The Nordic countries and Western 
Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand are the regions heavily populated with 
Swedish expats, compared to the other regions, thus a straightforward proportional sample 
would have yielded very few expat Swedes in other regions of the world. This is also why 
those two regions are represented by 2000 and 4000 respondents in the sample, respectively. 
The reasoning behind this sampling method was to ensure that the regions wasn’t represented 
by too few people and was big enough to be a foundation for statistical analyses (Versdotter 
2016: 290). Since the SOM data has the aim to represent the whole population of Swedish 
expats, this analysis will use a weight variable to be able to compensate for the skewness 
created by the disproportional stratification.  
 
The survey invitation was sent out via regular mail to all the selected respondents that were 
registered at the Swedish Tax Authority, and instructed the respondents to answer the survey 
online. The survey comprised 75 questions on issues such as democracy, politics, 
socioeconomic status, interests and values. The survey got a response rate of 27%, which 
means that from the sample of 10 000, 2668 people answered the survey (Vernsdotter 
2016:291). The Swedish citizens living in Asia had the highest response rate of 32% together 
with Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zeeland, with 31% response rate. 
Swedish citizens living in Africa and in the Middle East have the lowest response rate, and 
were also the region with the highest amounts of countries that gave no answers at all.  
 
The advantage of this dataset is that it is first of its kind, providing a unique foundation for 
expanding research in migration, political participation, political behavior, news consumption, 
religion, identity etc. The variety in the questions in the survey also allows for comparison, 
between both individuals and contexts. The dataset fits this thesis not only because it is data 
on Swedish expats, but also because it contains some question specifically about party choice, 
attitudinal positions and transnational activities.  
 
However, there are also disadvantages with this dataset. There is a problem around the fact 
that expatriates do not inform the Swedish Tax Agency about their move abroad. This makes 
the sample drawn from the agency problematic, creating a skewed sample of the population 
since it misses all those expatriates that don’t report their move abroad, or moves shorter than 
one year. Furthermore, there is also a risk that many of the addresses to the expatriates are 
wrong or not updated, since it is not an obligation for expatriates to report if they move. 
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Because of this, it is hard to know how many of the Swedish expats that never got the letter 
from the SOM insitute. This is very problematic, not only for the SOM insitute, but also for 
the Swedish Tax Agency, the Election Authority and other authorities.  
 
Moreover, the response rate of 27% is also a possible shortcoming, since it will be hard to 
draw general conclusions about this specific group of people. Since the response rate is low, 
there will be an uncertainty to how well the data fits the population. The expats that answered 
the survey might have been representing a specific group of expatriate Swedes, which means 
that there can be other groups of expats not represented in this data. Concerning the obvious 
issue of validity, there is a current debate around the presumption that lower response rate 
automatically equates to lower study validity. But several recent studies have shown that there 
is no direct correlation between response rate and validity (Morton et.al 2012, Visser et. al 
1996). Holbrook et.al (2007) demonstrated in his study that lower response rates were only 
marginally less accurate than with those with much higher response rates. Hence, lower 
response rates do not automatically mean low validity; it simply implies a potentially greater 
risk of it. 
 
3.2 Expatriate Swedes 
The group of Swedes that live and work abroad are different in many aspects from the 
residential swedes. By comparing the SOM survey with expatriate swedes to the respondents 
in the national SOM survey, Solevid (2016) finds that the biggest difference between 
residential swedes and expatriate swedes are the levels of education. A staggering 58% of the 
Swedish expats are highly educated, compared to 26% of the residential swedes. Highly 
educated in this context means that they have a degree from university or post graduate 
studies. Additionally, higher education also affects which socioeconomic group the Swedish 
expats consider themselves to be in. Compared to residential swedes, expatriate swedes are to 
a greater extent officials with an executive function in the workplace. There is also a slightly 
higher proportion of expatriate swedes that consider themselves to manage very good on the 
current income compared to people living in Sweden. Furthermore, the factor of age is not 
distributed evenly when it comes to Swedish expats. Almost half of the expats who answered 
the survey is between 30-49 years old, which means that the respondents in this survey are to 
a lower degree younger and older compared to the respondents in the national SOM survey. 
The findings of education and age - the fact that Swedish expatriates in general have a higher 
education and are in the age between 30-49 - is in line with SCB: s data on Swedish expats, 
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which is based on the Swedish national registration (SCB 2014). Furthermore, when 
comparing Swedish expats view on immigration with the national SOM survey, the data 
shows that expatriate Swedes only have a marginally more negative attitude to immigration 
with 44% compared to residential Swedes with 43% (Demker 2015: 264, SOM survey 2014). 
In addition, when it comes to Swedish expatriates’ experiences and identities, my own 
analysis of the data show that Swedish expatriates are in a larger extent transnational in the 
way they partake in activities and develop experiences from both home and host country 
(SOM-survey 2014).  Therefore, the variation between expatriates’ transnational identities 
and transborder identities is not as high as one wished for, but it is still enough to use in an 
analysis. To summarize, the fact that expats have higher education, higher working positions 
and manage very well on their income, Swedish expats are to be considered a well-established 
group (Solevid 2016: 17).  
 
3.3 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable- voted for the Sweden Democrats- is measured by Q27 ”Which party 
did you vote for in the Swedish national election 2014?”. There are 9 answering options for 
the 8 parties in the Swedish parliament and Feminist Initiative, but as this thesis interest lies 
in if the expats voted for the Sweden Democrats or not, the variable was recoded into a 
dichotomous variable. The respondents’ answers are now divided in 1=voted for SD and 
0=did not vote for SD. Additionally, this survey has a total of 2668 respondents, but as nearly 
30% of the respondents answered that they did not vote in the election at all, only 1222 of the 
respondents will be included in this survey.  
 
3.4 Independent variables 
As the theoretical framework consist of two strands of literature, previous research on radical 
right voting and transnationalism, the independent variables will be categorized into two sets 
of variables: variables related to attitudinal positions and variables related to 
transnational/transborder identities. Additionally, a variable concerning the relationship 
between negative attitudes to immigration and different kinds of national identification will be 
added as an interaction term. 
 
3.4.1 Attitudinal related independent variables 
In line with previous research on radical right voters, the attitudinal positioning towards 
immigration will be added as a variable. This thesis expects that Swedish expatriates with a 
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more negative attitude to immigration will have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden 
Democrats. To be able to measure the respondents’ attitudes to immigration, this thesis will 
use two questions: Q15 “What is your opinion about: accepting fewer refugees?” and Q45 
“In what amount do you agree with the following; Immigration enriches the Swedish culture” 
and create an index. The index was reliability tested with a Cronbach Alpha, and showed a 
value of 0.74. These two questions are the most suited questions from the data set to measure 
attitudes to immigration. However, an additional question surrounding opinions about 
accepting immigrants and not necessarily refugees would have been preferable, as people can 
view them differently (O’Rourke et.al 2006: 845) The index will be coded so that a low 
number will represent a positive attitude to immigration and a high number represent a 
negative attitude to immigration.4 
 
The following independent variable in this analysis will be political trust. Since this thesis 
focuses on Swedish expats voting in Swedish elections, the factor of political trust will only 
concern Swedish politicians and institutions, and not the political arena in the host country. 
Therefore, Q14 ”How much confidence do you have for the way the Swedish Parliament 
manage their work?” and Q17 ”How much confidence do you have for the politicians in 
Sweden?” will be combined into an index that will measure the level of political trust. The 
Cronbach alpha showed a value of 0.75. Similar to the index above, this index will also be 
coded with a low number representing a high trust towards politicians and a high number 
representing low levels of trust. 5 
 
The last independent variable within this category concerns the aspect of general and social 
trust. In line with previous research (Rydgren 2009), this thesis will operationalize social trust 
with three questions from the SOM-survey. In the SOM-survey, the respondent where asked 
three questions about trust in different aspects; Q38 “In your opinion, to what extent can you 
rely on people in general?”, Q39“Do you think most people would try to make use of you if 
they got the chance or would they try to be honest and fair?” and Q40 ”Would you say that 
people mostly try to be helpful or that they are looking for themselves?”. These three 
questions were then combined into an index to be able to measure a bigger spectrum of social 
and generalized trust. The index showed a Cronbach alpha of 0.87. Yet again, this index is 
                                                 
4 For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A 
5 For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A  
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also coded as low numbers representing high social trust and high numbers representing low 
social trust.6 
 
3.4.2 Transnational /transborder related independent variables 
To measure someone’s national identity and sentiment can be a difficult task, but this thesis 
will use two indicators to be able to measure if the respondents strongly affiliate either to 
Sweden, to their host country or both of them. People that have a strong national identity who 
have a fear of their national identity being threatened by outsiders are more likely to support 
the radical right (Rydgren 2008, 2009). Therefore, it is important that this analysis includes 
variables that can, in the best way possible, measure the Swedish expats national identity. 
This thesis includes two different aspects of national identity to be able to create good proxies 
and ensure the content validity of the independent variable.7  Previously mentioned in the 
theoretical framework, Berg (2007) argues that individuals can have no attachment, exclusive 
or multiple territorial attachments. In this paper, the exclusive attachment can be connected to 
expatriates transborder identification, as they only affiliate with one country. Consequently, 
the multiple attachments can be connected to expatriates’ transnational identification, as they 
affiliate to two or more countries. In her research, Berg (2007) uses a question concerning 
where the respondents feel at home. Similarly, this thesis will use Q43 How well do you feel 
at home in; Sweden and in Host country and create a ‘territorial attachment’ variable, that will 
divide the expatriates into 4 different groups; 1= Weak attachment to both Sweden and Host 
country, 2= Strong attachment to Sweden (weak to Host country), 3= Strong attachment to 
Host country (weak to Sweden) and 4= Strong attachment to both Sweden and Host country. 
The second group can be seen as the expatriates with a transborder identification, and the 
fourth group can be seen as the expatriates with a transnational identification. The variable 
was then recoded into 4 dummy variables that will be used in the analysis, where Weak 
attachment to both Sweden and Host country will be left as a reference variable. 
 
In addition, Hjerm (2001) argues that the related concept of national pride is a good proxy for 
national identity. This can be understood as a form of national sentiment and national 
                                                 
6 For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A  
7 Even though this thesis includes two aspect that measure national identity, it is of course difficult to 
operationalize it so that it covers the whole multidimensional spectrum that is national identity. Therefore, this 
thesis is aware of its content validity being challenged by the difficulty to construct a national identity variable. 
This might affect the results and conclusions that can be drawn. However, this thesis tries to account for this 
problem by drawing from previous research and including two different proxies for national identity. The chosen 
variables show a correlation 0.29 and thus do not correlate highly. Thus, they measure different aspects of 
national identity. For correlation matrix, see Appendix B 
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belonging, based on both political and ethno-cultural aspects (Hjerm 2001: 47). The focus lies 
on the attitudes of nationalism that people have towards their nation or national belonging 
(Hjerm 2001:46). Therefore, this thesis will create an index that will measure the ‘National 
pride’ towards Sweden. In Q44 To what extent do the following claims apply to your 
relationship with Sweden? there are five different statements about expats feelings towards 
Sweden that will be used in order to operationalize the national pride; 1) It is important for me 
to celebrate Swedish holidays, 2) I am proud to be Swedish, 3) I often miss Sweden, 4) I 
always root for Sweden in international competitions, 5) Sweden as a country is a good role 
model. An index was created using these five statements, which showed a Chronbach’s alpha 
of 0.70. In this index, high numbers translate to having strong nationalist pride towards 
Sweden, and low numbers translates to not having strong nationalist pride towards Sweden.8 
 
3.5 Control variables  
Based on previous research, three control variables will be added to my analysis; gender, age 
and education. Good control variables in a logistic regression should be correlated to both the 
explanatory variables and the outcome variable (Aneshensel 2013:250). Research show that 
age, gender and education matters when looking at attitudinal positions and national identity. 
O’Rourke (et.al 2006) demonstrates that people with better socioeconomic characteristics are 
less opposed immigration and Luedtke (2005) shows in his research that low-skilled 
individuals with a lower education can have a stronger national identity. These socio-
economic characteristics have also been shown to be important when identifying who votes 
for radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000, Givens 2004, Kreisi 2006, Zhirkov 
2014). Research show that lower educated people are compared to highly educated people 
more likely to vote for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, Kitschelt 2007). A higher 
education has a liberalizing effect that introduces a shift towards cultural liberalism and 
universalism. Education levels have been coded into three different dummy variables. ‘Low 
education’ equals an education level of completed primary school and attendance to high 
                                                 
8 ‘Years abroad’ and ‘Double or Swedish citizenship’ were potential variables that I considered to add in the 
analysis. Scholars argue that the time spent abroad increase socialization in host country and can further lead to 
disengagement from home country, and can in this case been seen as an indicator of de-integration from Sweden 
(Ahmadov & Sasse 2016: 83, Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003: 1215). Furthermore, scholars also argue that 
citizenship is important to consider political rights that an expat has depending on single/double citizenship. 
Dual nationality can be seen as enabling the possibility for transnational activities (Bauböck 2003). Even though 
both of these variables have some significance to research about political participation, they do not have enough 
empirical evidence of being an indicator of how expatriate choose one party over another. When added in the 
analysis, none of the variables showed any significance. Furthermore, it was in this thesis interest to have few 
joint variables that could operationalize national identity and affiliation, rather than many variables that all 
measured similar things. 
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school. ‘Middle education’ includes graduation from high school and studies at university. 
‘High education’ equals graduation from university and/or graduate school. In this analysis, 
‘Low Education’ will be used as a reference group. There are also some differences between 
men and women; men tend to be overrepresented in the electorate of radical right parties 
(Givens 2004). Therefore, the variable of gender is coded as Male=1, as I expect males to 
have a higher likelihood to vote for SD. When it comes to age differences, research has shown 
that young people are more likely to vote for radical right parties, as they are more responsive 
to the radical right rhetoric (Arzheimer 2009). But recent studies, specifically in Sweden, have 
shown some evidence towards a reverse in the age gap, with people over the age of 50 now 
having strongest support for the Sweden Democrats (Sannerstedt 2016: 167). The age variable 
is coded into four different dummy variables; 18-29, 30-49, 50-64 and 65-75. The age 18-29 
will be used as a reference group. As mentioned above, the respondents of the SOM-survey of 
Swedish expats have, compared to residential Swedes, a higher level of education and are 
largely in the age range of 30-49, which might affect the outcome of the analysis (Vernsdotter 
2016: 295). Table 1 below summarizes the descriptive statistics for the different variables that 
will be used in the statistical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 1. Descriptive table 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max N 
Voted for SD .066 .248 0 1 1222 
Attitudes to immigration 4.83 2.30 2 10 1222 
Political trust 4.31 1.16 2 8 1222 
Social trust 8.26 5.20 0 30 1222 
Weak attachment to SE & host country (ref) 0.21 0.41 0 1 1222 
Strong attachment SE (weak host) 0.25 0.47 0 1 1222 
Strong attachment to Host country (weak to SE) 0.14 0.35 0 1 1222 
Strong attachment to SE and Host country 0.38 0.48 0 1 1222 
National pride SE 15.43 2.77 5 20 1222 
Gender (1=Male) 0.46 0.49 0 1 1222 
Low Education (ref) 0.04 0.21 0 1 1222 
Middle Education 0.31 0.46 0 1 1222 
High Education 0.65 0.48 0 1 1222 
Age 18-29 (ref) 0.12 0.32 0 1 1222 
Age 30-49 0.49 0.50 0 1 1222 
Age 50-64 0.23 0.42 0 1 1222 
Age 65-75 0.15 0.35 0 1 1222 
 
3.6 Statistical method 
As my outcome variable is dichotomous, I have chosen to conduct a logistic regression for 
this research paper. When conducting a logistic regression, the elaboration model is analyzed 
in a different way from when doing an OLS regression. When performing an OLS regression, 
there is an assumption that the relationships between the variables are linear. This assumption 
is violated when it comes to using an outcome variable that is categorical. A way around this 
problem is by transforming the data by using the logarithmic transformation. Instead of 
predicting the value of the outcome variable from one or several predictor variables, we 
predict the probability of the outcome variable occurring given the known values of the 
independent variables (Field 2013: 762). Further, rather than looking at the value of b-
coefficient when analyzing the outcome of a logistic regression, one should only focus on the 
sign of the coefficient (negative or positive). Moreover, in a logistic regression it is possible 
to calculate the odds ratio to illustrate the effects size. The odds ratio is calculated by using 
the exponential value of the b-coefficient, and indicates the change in the odds resulting from 
a unit change in the predictor. The odds ratio can be interpreted in terms of the change in the 
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odds: if the value of the odds ratio is bigger than 1, it indicates that as the predictor increases, 
the odds of the outcome occurring increases. When the value is less than 1, it indicates that as 
the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decreases (Field 2012:767). 
Additionally, when using logistic regression, it is important to investigate how well the 
chosen models fit the data. In a logistic regression, Nagelkerke’s R2 value can be used when 
comparing models. Nagelkerke’s R2 is a pseudo R-square and can be seen as equivalent to R-
squares in OLS regressions, as they measure the substantive significance of a model and can 
be used as a measure of explained variation (Field 2013:764-766).  
 
In this analysis, 8 different regression models will be performed. Model 1a and 1b analyzes 
the first focal relationship concerning attitudinal positions and levels of trust and their effect 
on voting for the Sweden Democrats, model 1a without control variables and model 1b with 
control variables. Model 2a and 2b analyses the second focal relationship concerning 
transnational/transborder identities and their effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats. 
Model 3a and 3b analyses the two focal relationships together. Lastly, model 4a and 4b 
analyses the two focal relationships with control variables together with the two interaction 
terms. In line with the codebook, to account for the disproportional stratified selection, the 
data is weighted with a weight variable.  
 
4. Results 
In this chapter, the empirical results will be presented. Table 2 shows the findings of 
attitudinal related variables and transnational/transborder identities on voting for the Sweden 
Democrats, separately. Table 3 present the full model where two focal relationships are tested 
together. Each outcome from every model will be presented, but most emphasis will be put on 
the full model 3b and the variables with significant impact, where some variables will be 
further illustrated with graphs of predicted probabilities. Table 4 includes the full model 
together with the interaction terms. All interactions will be plotted in graphs to better 
understand the relationships between the variables. 
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Table 2.  Logistic regression analysis. The effects of attitudinal related variables and 
transborder/transnational related variables respectively on voting for the Sweden Democrats  
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
 B-coeff 
Odds 
ratio 
B-coeff 
Odds 
ratio 
B-coeff 
Odds 
ratio 
B-coeff 
Odds 
ratio 
Attitudes to immigration 
(2-10, 10=very negative) 
.844*** 
(.093) 
2.325 
.838*** 
(.095) 
2.312     
Political Trust 
(2-8, 8=low political trust) 
-.605*** 
(.111) 
1.832 
.602*** 
(.114) 
1.825     
Social Trust 
(0-30, 30=low social trust) 
-.007 
(.027) 
.943 
-.013 
(.028) 
.987     
Weak attachment to SE & host 
country (ref) 
        
Strong attachment SE (weak 
host) 
    
-.019 
(.347) 
.981 
-.157 
(.357) 
.857 
Strong attachment to Host 
country (weak to SE) 
    
.228 
(.349) 
1.257 
-.024 
(.360) 
1.024 
Strong attachment to SE & 
Host country 
    
-.151 
(.316) 
.860 
-.204 
(.328) 
.815 
National Pride SE 
(5-20, 20=High national pride) 
    
-.096* 
(.041) 
.908 
-.092* 
(.044) 
.912 
Gender (1=Male)   
.540* 
(.316) 
1.717   
.879*** 
(.253) 
2.409 
Education Low (ref)         
Education Middle   
-.751 
(.522) 
.472   
-1.019* 
(.422) 
.361 
 
Education High   
-.801 
(.502) 
.449   
-1.509*** 
(.411) 
.221 
Age 18-29 (ref)         
Age 30-49   
-.465 
(.481) 
.628   
-.265 
(.373) 
.767 
Age 50-64   
-.657 
(.521) 
.518   
-.390 
(.417) 
.677 
Age 65-75   
-.290 
(.537) 
.748   
-.165 
(.429) 
.847 
Constant 
-11.261 
(.891) 
 
-10.337 
(1.084) 
 
-1.180 
(.625) 
 
-.190 
(.900) 
 
Nagelkerke r2 .501  .513  .019  .075  
-2 Log Likelihood 337.843  330.632  595.134  567.872  
N 1222  1222  1222  1222  
Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a 
dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-
coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: 
SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data. 
 
Model 1a tests the effects of attitudes toward immigration, political trust and social trust on 
voting for the Sweden democrats. There is a significant positive relationship between both 
attitudes to immigration, political trust and voting for the Sweden democrats. There is no 
significant relationship between social trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. In model 
1b, the control variables are added and the relationship between attitudes to immigration, 
political trust and voting for Sweden Democrats remains positive and significant, thus 
indicating no spuriousness in the relationships. Model 2a tests the effects of territorial 
attachment and national pride on voting for the Sweden democrats. Having strong attachment 
to Sweden, the host country or to both countries show no significant effect on voting on SD 
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compared to respondents with weak attachment to both countries. However, the variable of 
‘national pride SE’ show an, albeit weak, significant negative effect, indicating that Swedish 
expats with a higher/stronger national pride towards Sweden have a lower likelihood to vote 
for the Sweden Democrats, which is not in line with H2. Adding the control variables in 
model 2b doesn’t alter the interpretations. To visualize the relationship between ‘National 
pride SE’ and voting for the Sweden Democrats in model 2b, the predicted probabilities have 
been plotted below. Here we can see that the stronger national pride expatriates have towards 
Sweden, the less likely they are to vote for the Sweden Democrats, which is the exact 
opposite of what was expected in H2. 
 
Figure 2 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels 
national pride towards Sweden 
 
 
 
Comment: predicted probability based on model 2b in Table 2 
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Table 3. Logistic regression analysis. Effect of attitudinal related variables and 
transborder/transnational related variables together on voting for the Sweden Democrats  
 Model 3a Model 3b 
 B-coeff Odds ratio B-coeff Odds ratio 
Attitudes to immigration 
(2-10, 10=very negative) 
.853*** 
(.094) 
2.345 .848*** 
(.097) 
2.354 
Political Trust 
(2-8, 8=low political trust) 
.627*** 
(.119) 
1.872 -.635*** 
(.123) 
1.886 
Social Trust 
(0-30, 30=low social trust) 
-.007 
(.027) 
.993 -.014 
(.028) 
.988 
Weak attachment to SE & host 
country (ref) 
    
Strong attachment to SE (weak 
to host) 
.292 
(.442) 
1.339 .175 
(.454) 
1.191 
Strong attachment to Host 
country (weak to SE) 
-.091 
(.464) 
.913 -.171 
(.478) 
.843 
Strong attachment to SE & host 
country 
.245 
(.408) 
1.278 -.304 
(.431) 
1.355 
National Pride SE 
(5-20, 20=High national pride) 
.003 
(.059) 
1.003 .012 
(.063) 
1.013 
Interaction term     
Gender (1=Male)   .610* 
(.335) 
1.819 
Education Low (ref)     
Education Middle   -.787 
(.534) 
.455 
Education High   -.798 
(.516) 
.450 
Age 18-29 (ref)     
Age 30-49   -.364 
(.493) 
.695 
Age 50-64   -.581 
(.538) 
.569 
Age 65-75   -.245 
(.543) 
.783 
Constant -11.575 
(1.425) 
 -11.219 
(1.801) 
 
Nagelkerke r2 .503  .516  
-2 Log Likelihood 337.099  329.555  
N 1222  1222  
Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a 
dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-
coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: 
SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data 
 
In model 3a, the two focal relationships are tested together. The b-coefficient of ‘Attitudes to 
immigration’ still shows a significant positive value, indicating that expats with a more 
negative attitude to immigration have a higher estimated likelihood to vote for the Sweden 
Democrats. The same goes for ‘Political trust’, as it shows a positive significant relationship, 
meaning that expats with a lower level of political trust have a higher estimated likelihood to 
vote for the Sweden Democrats. The variable of ‘Social trust’ still shows no significant 
relationship. Having strong attachment to Sweden, the host country or to both countries show 
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no significant effect on voting on SD compared to respondents with weak attachment to both 
countries. Likewise, the variable of ‘national pride SE’ also shows no significant effect on 
voting for the Sweden Democrats. 
 
In model 3b, the two focal relationships together with control variables were tested. The 
association between ‘Attitude to immigration’ and voting for the Sweden Democrats keeps 
show a positive significance.  The odds ratio is 2.354, which can be interpreted as the odds for 
expatriates with a more negative attitude to immigration to vote for the Sweden Democrats is 
estimated to be more than twice as great compared to expatriate with a positive attitude to 
immigration, which is in line with H1a. Furthermore, to visualize the results, the predicted 
probabilities are shown in figure 3. Here we can see voting for the Swedish Democrats is 
much more likely among expats with a more negative attitude to immigration compared to 
expats with a more positive attitude to immigration. Swedish expats with a more negative 
attitude to immigration have a predicted probability of 59% to vote for the Swedish 
Democrats, after adjusting for other variables. This compared to the expats with a positive 
attitude to immigration that on average has a predicted probability of 0.07% to vote for the 
Swedish Democrats, after adjusting for all other variables. 
 
Figure 3 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels of 
attitudes to immigration 
 
 
Comment: predicted probability based on full model 3b in Table 3 
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Furthermore, the variable concerning expats trust to Swedish politicians and institutions keeps 
showing a positive significant relationship. The odds ratio is 1.886, which means that the odds 
for expatriates with a lower political trust to vote for the Sweden Democrats is estimated to be 
almost than twice as great compared to expatriates with a higher level of political trust, which 
is in line with H1b. In figure 3, the predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats 
under different levels of political trust are shown. Swedish expats with a low level of political 
trust have a predicted probability of 55 % to vote for the Swedish Democrats, after adjusting 
for other variables. This compared to the expats with a high level of political trust that on 
average has a predicted probability of 0.3% to vote for the Swedish Democrats, after adjusting 
for all other variables. 
 
Figure 4 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels of 
political trust 
 
Comment: predicted probability based on full model 3b in Table 3 
 
Furthermore, in both model 3a and 3b, the associations between ‘Strong attachment to 
Sweden’, ‘National pride SE’ and voting or the Sweden Democrats becomes positive, but are 
not statistically significant. The same goes for ‘Strong attachment to Host country’ and 
‘Strong attachment to SE & host country’, which both show a negative association with 
voting for the Sweden Democrats, but are not statistically significant. This indicates that there 
is no association between territorial attachment, national pride and voting for the Sweden 
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Democrats. Thus, no support for H2 is found. The only control variable showing significance 
is ‘Gender’. As expected, expatriate males have a higher estimated likelihood to vote for the 
Sweden Democrats, compared to women. In terms of odds ratio, the odds of voting for the 
Sweden Democrats for men is estimated to almost twice as great compared to expatriate 
women. 
 
Worth noticing is the difference in Nagelkerke r2 between model 1b with the established 
explanations of radical right support, showing a value of .513 and model 2b with the 
transnational explanations, showing a value of .075. This indicates that the variance in the 
dependent variable ‘voted for Sweden Democrats’ can be much better explained by 
previously established explanations to radical right research than transnational or transborder 
identification. This can further be confirmed by the last full model 3b, that shows a value of 
.516, which is almost fully in line with model 1b. 
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Table 4. Logistic regression analysis with full models together with interaction terms on 
voting for the Sweden Democrats 
 Model 4a Model 4b 
 B-coeff Odds ratio B-coeff Odds ratio 
Attitudes to immigration 
(2-10, 10=very negative) 
.970*** 
(.232) 
2.652 1.072* 
(.527) 
2.902 
Political Trust 
(2-8, 8=low political trust) 
.657*** 
(.129) 
1.499 .633*** 
(.123) 
1.882 
Social Trust 
(0-30, 30=low social trust) 
-.017 
(.030) 
.984 -.014 
(.029) 
.986 
Weak attachment to SE & host 
country (ref) 
    
Strong attachment to SE (weak to 
host) 
-2.153 
(2.909) 
.116 .169 
(.455) 
1.184 
Strong attachment to Host 
country (weak to SE) 
-2.117 
(3.462) 
.113 -.178 
(.482) 
.837 
Strong attachment to SE & host 
country 
3.554 
(2.131) 
34.598 .310 
(.432) 
1.363 
National Pride SE 
(5-20, 20=High national pride) 
.024 
(.065) 
1.025 .128 
(.275) 
1.137 
Attitudes to immigration*Strong 
attachement SE 
.295 
(.351) 
1.334   
Attitudes to immigration*Strong 
attachement Host 
.233 
(.404) 
1.263   
Attitudes to immigration*Strong 
attachement SE & Host 
-.425 
(.263) 
.654   
Attitudes to immigration*National 
pride SE 
  -.015 
(.034) 
.985 
Gender (1=Male) .561 
(.340) 
1.753 .615 
(.335) 
1.849 
Education Low (ref)     
Education Middle -.688 
(546) 
.503 -.787 
(.532) 
.455 
Education High -.732 
(.531) 
.481 -.806 
(.515) 
.447 
Age 18-29 (ref)     
Age 30-49 -.388 
(.507) 
.678 -.354 
(.493) 
.702 
Age 50-64 -.638 
(.546) 
.529 -.571 
(.528) 
.565 
Age 65-75 -.207 
(.553) 
.801 -.231 
(.544) 
.794 
Constant -12.268 
(2.477) 
 -12.060 
(4.482) 
 
Nagelkerke r2 .532  .516  
-2 Log Likelihood 319.564  328.584  
N 1222  1222  
Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a 
dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-
coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: 
SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data 
 
I model 4a and 4b, the full model is tested together with the two interaction terms between 
attitudes to immigration and national identity, in order to test hypotheses 3: if attitudes to 
immigration affects expatriates’ probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats differently 
between types of national identity. The first interaction term test the interaction between 
attitudes to immigration*territorial attachment. Model 4a shows that attitudes to 
immigration*Strong attachment SE has a positive relationship. In graph A, we can see that 
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expats with strong attachment to SE (transborder) with a more negative attitude to 
immigration show a slightly higher likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats than expats 
with other types of territorial attachment. The same goes for attitudes to immigration*Strong 
attachment Host country, which also show a positive interaction effect. In graph B, we can see 
that expats with attachment to Host country with a more negative attitude to immigration 
show a marginally higher likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. The interaction effect 
of attitudes to immigration*Strong attachment SE & host country (transnational) show a 
negative effect, which means that have a lower likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats, 
compared to expatriates with other types of territorial attachment. This is visible in graph C. 
However, none of these interactions are significant, indicating that territorial attachment does 
not modify the effect of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats. In 
model 4b, we can see the negative effect of the last interaction term attitude to 
immigration*national pride SE. Figure D visualizes that the interaction term goes the opposite 
way than expected, that expatriates with low national pride towards Sweden are more likely to 
vote for the Sweden democrats. However, this interaction effect also showed no significance, 
which in the end means that national pride towards Sweden does not modify the effect of 
attitudes to immigration and voting for the Sweden democrats. Thus, there is no support for 
Hypotheses 3. 
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Interaction plots 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
To summarize, there is a strong significant relationship between attitudes to immigration, 
political trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Expatriates with a more negative attitude 
to immigration are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Expatriates with a low 
political trust are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Thus, this is supporting H1a 
and H1b. However, H1c is not supported, as there is no significant relationship between social 
trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Contrary to what hypotheses 2 expected, the 
analysis shows no significant relationship between different kinds of national identity 
(transborder and transnational) and voting for the Sweden Democrats. All variables added 
concerning national identity were not statistically significant, meaning that there is no support 
for hypotheses 2. Lastly, no support is found for hypotheses 3, different kinds of national 
B) A) 
C) D) 
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identity do not moderate the impact of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden 
Democrats. Taken together, the results show that there is no significant association between 
national identity and voting for Sweden Democrats, or a statistically significant interaction 
effect.  
 
5. Concluding discussion 
This thesis started out with the observation of an increasing number of Swedes emigrating 
abroad. As a part of the current globalization, migration does no longer only concern people 
from low-income countries, but also people migrating from affluent countries. The theory of 
transnationalism argues that when emigrants move from their home country to a host country, 
the multiplicity of political and social involvements affects migrants’ values, identities and 
the way they make decisions. Alongside with the increased migration and globalization, 
radical right parties have emerged all through Europe. Found in the 2014 SOM survey of 
Swedish expats, 7% of the expatriates voted for the radical right party of Sweden- the Sweden 
Democrats. Swedish expats are a group of people characterized by a higher socio-economic 
status, higher education levels and higher positions in the job market. Drawing from Kriesi’s 
(2006) theory of winners and losers of globalization, Swedish expats can arguably be viewed 
as the prominent ‘winners’ of globalization, as they are high skilled workers, with a higher 
educational degree that benefit from more fluent borders. This formed a conundrum of why 
the winners of globalization would vote for a radical right party, who mainly attracts the 
‘losers’ of globalization. Thus, the overall aim of this thesis was to investigate this specific 
occurrence, and look into what can explain Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden 
Democrats. By combing two strands of literature, transnationalism and radical right research, 
this thesis aimed to contribute to research by first testing three hypotheses concerning 
attitudinal factors; if attitudes to immigration, political trust and social trust had any effect on 
Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, this thesis also aimed to 
investigate whether differently developed national identities (transborder and transnational) 
had any effect on expatriates vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Lastly, this thesis also 
aimed to test if the presumed effect of anti-immigration attitudes leads to an even higher 
likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats among expatriates with strong national identity. 
 
Regarding the attitudinal factors, this thesis found a strong significant association between 
expatriates’ attitudes to immigration and voting for the Sweden Democrats. A more negative 
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attitude to immigration leads to increased likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. There 
was a significantly large difference in the predicted probabilities, where expats with a 
negative attitude to immigration had a predicted probability of 59% to vote for the Sweden 
Democrats, whilst expats with a positive attitude to immigration had a predicted probability of 
0.07% to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Thus, hypotheses 1a is supported. The factor of 
political trust also showed a significant association to voting for the Sweden Democrats. The 
results demonstrate that expatriates with lower levels of political trust have an increased 
likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Again, there was a large difference in the 
predicted probabilities, where expats with low levels of political trust had a predicted 
probability of 55% to vote for the Sweden Democrats, whilst expats with a high level of 
political trust has a predicted probability of 0.3% to vote for the Sweden Democrats. 
Therefore, hypotheses 1b is supported as well. However, the results show no significant 
association between expatriates’ social trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats, thus 
hypotheses 1c is refuted. 
 
Turning to the factors of transborder and transnational identification, the results showed no 
significant relationship between different kinds of national identity (transborder and 
transnational) and voting for the Sweden Democrats. There is no evidence that expatriates 
territorial attachment, or national pride have an effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats. 
Hypotheses 2 is thus not supported. Finally, no interaction effect is found: different kinds of 
national identity do not moderate the impact of attitudes to immigration on voting for the 
Sweden Democrats. Consequently, no support for hypotheses 3 is found.  
 
The significant results demonstrating that expatriates with a negative attitude to immigration 
and low political trust are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats is in line with 
previous research. But as previous research mainly is based on residential citizens, this thesis 
has added a new context to radical right research and has made an empirical contribution, by 
testing and confirming previously stated explanations on migrants that vote from abroad. 
Another empirical contribution is the test of the relationship between 
transnational/transborder national identities and voting for a radical right party, which rarely 
has been done before. Theoretically, this thesis further elaborated the national identity 
argument and its effect of radical right voting, that is put forward by previous scholars. This 
thesis intertwined the factor of national identity and nationalism from radical right research, 
together with the possibly developed national identities from political transnational 
39 
 
experiences. Further, the national identity mechanism was also tested in the new context of 
migrants that vote from abroad. However, contrary to previous research, the empirical 
analysis conclusively shows that there is no association between expatriate’s national identity 
and voting for the Sweden Democrats.  
 
It is clear from this analysis that the anti-immigrant and political trust explanations gets strong 
support, and that the national identity explanations get no support at all. A potential 
explanation to why national identity has no effect on expats vote support for the Sweden 
Democrats could be that national identity- feelings of home and pride towards Sweden- mean 
something else for expatriate Swedes compared to residential Swedes. It is possible to 
imagine that when people live aboard, it might become more important to celebrate Swedish 
holidays or root for Sweden in competitions, which also is visible empirically in the SOM 
survey on expatriate Swedes. The data also shows that many expatriates are proud of Sweden 
and see it as a role model. When living abroad, it might be more accepted to be proud of your 
home country and its cultural values, without it meaning that you would be critical to 
immigration and support a radical right party. This would be interesting to investigate further 
in future research, as the abstract concept of national identity could have different meaning 
for expatriates and residents.  
 
Furthermore, another possible shortcoming with this study that could explain the non-
significant impact of the national identity variables and the socioeconomic variables is the 
relative skewness of the data. Only a small part of the respondents is found in the groups with 
lower education and lower age and with transborder identification. When it comes to Swedish 
expats experiences and identities, the data showed that Swedish expatriates in a larger extent 
are transnational in the way they partake in activities and develop experiences from both 
home and host country. Because of this skewness, hypotheses 2 and hypotheses 3 were 
challenging to test, as the main group that were to be tested were expatriates with a 
transborder identification. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that among these winners, individuals who are strongly opposed 
to immigration to a great extent votes for the Sweden Democrats. Future research could be 
directed towards this finding, and towards investigating what it is that shapes these anti-
immigrant attitudes about the state of a country in which they no longer live in. Furthermore, 
future research of the context of settlement in which the expatriates find themselves could be 
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interesting to look into. Previous research shows that it might have an effect on their political 
behavior and preference, and could add an interesting perspective in future analysis. 
Moreover, additional research can be directed towards other groups of migrants, from 
countries other than Sweden that show support for radical right parties. An analysis where 
several country samples would be included could give a wider understanding and maybe 
present other explanations to expatriates radical right support. In the context of migrant 
research, this thesis focused on a group of migrants from a developed country, which is 
relatively rarely found compared to research about developing countries. Therefore, this thesis 
further calls for a research perspective recognizing this inchoate field. 
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Appendix A 
Voted for the Sweden Democrats 
(Q27) Which party did you vote for in the Swedish national election 2014? 1) Left Party  2) 
The Social Democrats 3) The Center Party 4) The Liberals 5) The Moderate Party 6) The 
Christian Democrats 7) The Green Party 8) The Sweden Democrats 9) Feminist Initiative 10) 
Other Party 11) Blank Vote. The original coding was replaced by 1) Voted for the Sweden 
Democrats 0) Did not vote for the Sweden Democrats (voted for any other party). 
 
Attitudes to immigration 
(Q15): “What is your opinion about: receiving a smaller number of refugees?” A 5-scale 
option that went from 1=’Very good suggestion’ to 5=’Very bad suggestion’. (Q45): “In what 
amount do you agree with the following; Immigration enriches the Swedish culture” 7-scale 
option that went from 1=Do not agree at all to 7=Fully agree. (Q45) was recoded to a 5-scale 
option, so that an index could be created. The scale showed a Cronbach Alpha of 0.749. 
 
Political trust 
(Q13): ”How much confidence do you have for the way the Swedish Parliament manage their 
work?” 5-scale option that went from 1=’Very large confidence’ to 5=’Very little 
confidence’. It was recoded into 4-scale option. (Q17): ”How much confidence do you have 
for Politicians in: Sweden?” 4-scale option that went from 1=’Very large confidence’ to 
4=’Very little confidence’. These questions were combined into an index with a Cronbach 
Alpha of 0.737. 
 
Social trust 
(Q38):”In your opinion, to what extent can you rely on people in general?” 10-scale option 
that went from 1=You cannot trust people in general to 10=You can trust people in general. 
(Q39): Do you think most people would try to make use of you if they got the chance or would 
they try to be honest and fair?” 10-scale options that went from 1=Most people would try to 
use me to 10=Most people would try to be honest. (Q40): ”Would you say that people mostly 
try to be helpful or that they are looking for themselves?” 10-scale option that went from 
1=People only look after themselves to 10=Most people try to be helpful. The three questions 
were combined into an index with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.868. 
 
Territorial attachment 
(Q43C) How well do you feel at home in Host country? A 7-scale option that went from 1= 
Do not feel at home at all to 7=Feel completely at home. (Q43D) How well do you feel at 
home in Sweden? A 7-scale option that went from 1= Do not feel at home at all to 7=Feel 
completely at home. By using both of these questions, “Territorial attachment’ was created 
with 4 options; 1) Weak attachment to both countries, 2) Strong attachment SE, weak host 
country, 3) Strong attachment Host country, weak to SE, 4) Strong attachment to SE and Host 
country. The line between weak and strong attachment is drawn by value 5 because of it being 
a skewed variable. In option 1) included answering option 1-5 from Q43C and 1-5 in Q43D. 
Option 2) included answering option 1-5 from Q43C and answering option 6-7 from Q43D. 
Option 3) included answering option 6-7 from Q43C and 1-5 from Q43D. Option 4) included 
answering options 6-7 from Q43C and 6-7 from Q43D. Before being out in the regression 
analysis, the variable was recoded in to four dummy variables, where ‘Weak attachment to 
both countries’ were used as a reference category. 
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National pride Sweden 
(Q44) To what extent does the following claims apply to your relationship to Sweden? 
(Q44A) It is important for me to celebrate Swedish holidays, (Q44B) I am proud to be 
Swedish, (Q44D) I often miss Sweden, (Q44E) I always root for Sweden in international 
competitions, and (Q44H) Sweden as a country is a good role model. The answering options 
went from 1=Completely agree to 4= Completely disagree. The five different question were 
combined into an index with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.700. 
 
Gender 
(Q51) Are you: 1) Male, 2) Female, 3) Other. The variable was recoded so that 1) Male and 
0) Female, and other responses excluded from the data. 
 
Education 
(Q74) Education level contained 7 different levels of education, and was recoded into three 
different categories 1) Low 2) Middle 3) High. The categories represent Low= Primary school 
and attendance to high school; Middle= graduation from high school and studies at university; 
High= graduation from university and/or graduate school. The three categories were coded as 
dummies where 0=No and 1=Yes, and the category of Low education was used as a reference 
category. 
 
Age 
(Q62) Which years where you born? This variable was divided into 4 different age groups; 1) 
18-29, 2) 30-49, 3) 50-64 and 4) 65-75. The four categories were coded as dummies with 
0=No and 1= Yes. The age 18-29 were used as a reference category. 
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Appendix B 
Correlation matrix- correlations between the four dummy variables ‘territorial attachment’ 
and ‘national pride SE’ 
 
 National Pride 
Se 
Weak 
attachment SE& 
Host country 
Strong 
attachment SE 
(weak to host) 
Strong 
attachment Host 
(weak to SE) 
Strong 
attachment SE 
& host 
National Pride 
SE 
1     
Weak 
attachment SE& 
Host country 
-.108** 1    
Strong 
attachment SE 
(weak to host) 
.218** -.249** 1   
Strong 
attachment Host 
(weak to SE) 
-.299** -.247** -.243** 1  
Strong 
attachment SE 
& host 
.152** -.416** -.410** -.407** 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
